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The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, 
among other things that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.”
1
 The “assistance of counsel” clause originally meant that 
defendants in federal criminal cases had the right to be assisted by 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; member of the CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW; University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas, B.A., Political Science, 2011. 
1
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added) (“In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense”). 
1
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 It initially only applied to federal cases because the 
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states until the early 1920s when the 
Supreme Court started to incorporate those rights using the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
 Consequently, there 
were no Sixth Amendment claims regarding the sufficiency of counsel 
in federal cases for over a century after the Sixth Amendment was 
ratified.
4
 Many states, however, had assistance-of-counsel statutes in 
place guaranteeing counsel in certain circumstances, usually for 
capital cases or indigent defendants.
5
 Although there were several 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought in state 
courts,
6
 those claims generally failed.
7
 However, the state cases that 
were successful led to widespread acceptance that the right to counsel 
clause of the Sixth Amendment meant effective assistance of counsel.
8
 
In 1932, the Supreme Court applied the right to counsel to a state 
court conviction.
9
 In Powell v. Alabama, nine African American men 
were accused of raping two white women.
10
 At that time, rape was a 
capital offense,
11
 but the defendants were completely cut off from their 
families and were never formally appointed counsel.
12
 The trial court 
judge “appointed all the members of the bar for the purpose of 
arraigning the defendants” and assumed that someone would step in to 
defend the men.
13
 Eventually two lawyers did volunteer to represent 
                                                 
2
 Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (citing Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 661 
n.17 (1948)). 
3
 Id. at 6. 
4
 Id. at 5. 
5
 Id. at 6. 
6
 Id. at 6-7; see, e.g., Roper v. Territory, 33 P. 1014, 1016 (N.M. 1893); People 
v. Nitti, 143 N.E. 448, 453 (Ill. 1924). 
7
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
8
 Id. at 10. 
9
 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
10
 Id. at 49. 
11
 Id. at 50. 
12
 Id. at 49, 52-53. 
13
 Id. at 49. 
2
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the accused men, but were not given time to investigate or prepare a 
defense.
14
 Additionally, the accused were not able to meet with the 
lawyers before the trials started.
15
 The trials lasted only one day each, 
and all of the men were convicted.
16
 All but one of the accused was 
sentenced to death.
17
 The Supreme Court held that the men were “not 
accorded the right to counsel in any substantial sense”
18
 because the 




Finally, in 1942 the Supreme Court found that the Sixth 
Amendment encompassed the right to effective assistance of counsel in 
federal criminal cases in Glasser v. United States.
20
 Following Powell 
and Glasser, the Supreme Court decided several cases concerning 
effective assistance of counsel, but did not establish a standard for 
lower courts to determine what was considered “effective.”
21
 The lack 
of a standard prompted the lower courts to establish the “farce and 
mockery” standard to determine ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.
22
 The “farce and mockery” standard was developed by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and provided that, to 
state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the case must shock 
the conscience “with exceptional circumstances showing the 
proceedings were a farce and a mockery of justice.”
23
 This standard 
posed a significant hurdle for defendants, and reflected courts’ 
presumptions that attorneys were providing satisfactory aid to 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 53. 
15
 Id.  
16
 Id. at 50. 
17
 Id. at 50. 
18
 Id. at 58. 
19
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 11. 
20
 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 68 (1942). 
21
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 13. See, e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 
(1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). 
22
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
23
 Patrick S. Metze, Speaking Truth to Power: the Obligation of the Courts to 
Enforce the Right to Counsel at Trial, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 187 (2012). 
3
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 Eventually, when analyzing the right to counsel under the 
Due Process Clause, several states imposed the requirement that 
prejudice is required to state a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel under the “face and mockery” test.
25
 This requirement is 
significant because “irrespective of how poor counsel's conduct may 
have been, if the defendant was not harmed, there was no 
constitutional violation and therefore nothing to guide future 
conduct.”
26
 The lower courts moved from the “farce and mockery” test 
under the Due Process Clause to the reasonable competence test under 
the Sixth Amendment in the 1970s.
27
 The reasonable competence test 
provides that “trial counsel fails to render effective assistance when he 
does not exercise the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably 
competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.”
28
 
The “farce and mockery” test was increasingly found to be too high a 
burden for defendants making out ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.
29
 The reasonable competence test was supposed to be more 
lenient than the previous test; however, many circuit courts concluded 
the two standards were basically the same.
30
 
The right to effective assistance of counsel is imperative in 
protecting the fundamental right to a fair trial.
31
 An attorney’s 
expertise is necessary to provide defendants with an opportunity to 
defend their case.
32
 This is why the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Sixth Amendment to mean that criminal defendants have the right to 
be appointed counsel if they cannot retain their own.
33
 However, an 
                                                 
24
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 15. 
25
 See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977). 
26
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 17. 
27
 Id. at 20-21. 
28
 Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United 
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
29
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 23-24.  
30
 Id. at 22, 24. 
31




 Id. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
4
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attorney’s presence is not all that is required by the Constitution.
34
 An 
attorney’s presence and assistance is necessary to ensure that the 
defendant receives a fair trial.
35
 The Gideon v. Wainwright decision 
suggests that “counsel must provide clients with advice about 
substantive legal issues and the intricacies of criminal procedure and 
must serve as advocates, guiding clients in the strategic and tactical 
decision making involved in trials.”
36
 By rendering ineffective 
assistance of counsel, an attorney deprives a defendant of his or her 
Sixth Amendment Constitutional right.
37
 Finally, in 1984, the Supreme 
Court decided Strickland v. Washington.
38
 Strickland laid out a 




Until 2010, Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims were analyzed under the two-prong test laid out in Strickland.
40
 
Under Strickland, a defendant must show: (1) ineffective counsel 
whose conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 
(2) that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the 
defense.
41
 In other words, to state a claim under Strickland, a lawyer’s 




The first prong of Strickland is analyzed using a reasonableness 
standard.
43
 Courts look at “prevailing professional norms”
44
 to 






 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U.S. 335 (1963), that not providing counsel deprives 
defendants’ access to counsel’s expertise, and thus the shot at a fair trial).  
37




 Id. at 674. 
40
 Id. at 687-88. 
41
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determine whether an attorney’s actions are reasonable. There is a 
strong presumption in favor of attorneys’ reasonableness.
45
 To satisfy 
the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that 
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
46
 
Although criminal defendants are guaranteed the effective 
assistance of counsel,
47
 courts have limited that right through use of 
the collateral consequences doctrine.
48
 The collateral consequences 
doctrine is used to determine the circumstances in which a criminal 
defendant may challenge his counsel’s effectiveness under the Sixth 
Amendment.
49
 However, the Supreme Court has never used the 
doctrine in its analysis of Sixth Amendment claims.
50
 Most federal and 
state courts have determined that the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel applies only to direct, not collateral, 
consequences of a criminal conviction.
51
 The difference between direct 
and collateral consequences is often hard to discern.
52
 Generally, direct 
consequences are defined as “definite, immediate and largely 
automatic effect[s] on the range of a defendant’s punishment.”
53
 
Examples of direct consequences include criminal punishments such 
as jail time, probation, imprisonments, and fines.
54
 On the other hand, 
collateral consequences are civil sanctions, as opposed to penal 
                                                 
45
 Chhablani, supra note 2, at 35. 
46
 Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
47
 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1985) (The Supreme Court held 
that criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel 
when pleading guilty under the Sixth Amendment). 
48
 Allison C. Callaghan, Padilla v. Kentucky: A Case for Retroactivity, 46 U.C. 




 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (“We, however, have never applied a distinction  
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”).  
51
 Callaghan, supra note 48 at 708. 
52
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53
 Callaghan, supra note 48, at 708. 
54
 Id. at 708-709.  
6
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 Collateral consequences commonly “[stem] from the fact 
of conviction, rather than the explicit punishment issued by the 
court.”
56
 In other words, they are “indirect consequences” of criminal 
convictions.
57
 These consequences affect the convicted individual’s 
civil, political, social, and economical rights.
58
 Thus, deportation is 
considered a collateral consequence, as it is borne out of a criminal 
conviction.
59
 Consequently, up until 2010, Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel relief was not available to noncitizen 




In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky. In 
Padilla, the Court determined that deportation has a distinct nature, 
which warrants special consideration under the first prong of the 
Strickland test.
61
 Under Padilla, an attorney must advise a noncitizen 
client of the risk of deportation when they are considering taking a 
plea deal.
62
 This is partially due to the fact that “deportation is a 
                                                 
55
 Id. at 709. 
56
 Id. See also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance 
of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699-
700 (2002) (comparing the effects of direct consequences to those of collateral 
consequences). 
57
 Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated 
Individuals, 86 B.U.L. REV. 623, 634 (2006) (citing Michael Pinard, Broadening the 
Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal 
Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1073 (2004)). 
58
 Callaghan, supra note 48 at 709 (citing Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of 
Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration and Their Effects on 
Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 299, 307-08 (2005)). 
59
 Id.  
60
 Chin & Holmes, supra note 56 at 706-708 (2002) (listing jurisdictions that 
have held defense counsel only need to explain direct consequences of a conviction 
to satisfy the Sixth Amendment)). 
61
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 It is also due to the “intimate connection 
between criminal convictions and the resulting, nearly mechanical, 
civil penalty of deportation.”
64
 
The extreme importance of the Padilla rule is highlighted by the 
changes in the United States’ immigration law.
65
 Traditionally, there 
were few types of offenses that resulted in deportation.
66
 However, as 
immigration reform has become more prevalent, more types of 
offenses have become deportable, making it necessary to allow 
noncitizen’s potential relief under the Sixth Amendment.
67
 Now, 
noncitizens face an increased likelihood of being deported after a 
criminal conviction because of the evolution of immigration law and 




At the outset of the United States, immigration was widespread 
and unhampered.
69
 Even early attempts to regulate deportation of 
potentially dangerous immigrants were met with disapproval.
70
 As 
time progressed, Congress began to enact statutes regulating 
immigration, such as prohibiting people convicted of felonies from 
entering the United States.
71
  
Immigration law changed entirely when Congress passed the 
Immigration Act of 1917.
72
 Before 1917, immigration law dealt with 
                                                 
63
 Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
64
 Callaghan, supra note 48, at 711. 
65
 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364. 
66




 See id. at 363. 
69
 Id. at 360 (citing C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and 
Procedure § 1.(2)(a), pg. 5 (1959)). 
70
 See, e.g., id. (discussing the unpopularity of the Act of June 25, 1978, ch. 58, 
1 Stat. 571, which allowed the President the power to deport immigrants “he 
judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”). 
71
 Id. (discussing early immigration laws passed by Congress). 
72
 Id. at 361 (citing S. Rep. No. 151, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 54-55 (1950)). 
8
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
153 
preventing certain people from immigrating to the United States,
73
 as 
opposed to removing existing immigrants from the United States. The 
Immigration Act of 1917 made convictions for crimes involving moral 
turpitude deportable offenses for the first time.
74
  
While the Act did allow for deportations, it also had procedural 
safeguards for immigrants.
75
 Judges were able to make 
recommendations either at sentencing or within 30 days that certain 
noncitizens be exempt from deportation.
76
 This safeguard was meant 
to prevent unjust deportations.
77
 Although they were termed “judicial 
recommendations against deportation,”
78
 these recommendations in 
practice were binding and the Act was “consistently . . . interpreted as 
giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a 
particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for 
deportation.”
79
 Judicial discretion, combined with Congress’s failure 
to define “moral turpitude,” meant that there was no automatic 
deportation for any offense.
80
  
Starting in 1952 with the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Congress began to eliminate the discretionary power of judges to 
recommend that certain “aliens” not be deported.
81
 By 1990, Congress 
had completely eliminated the judicial discretionary power.
82
 
Continuing this pattern, Congress next disposed of a similar 
                                                 
73
 Id. at 360-61 (noting statutes passed prior to 1917 banned convicts, 
prostitutes, and those who committed crimes involving moral turpitude from 
entering the country). 
74
 Id. at 361 (“Section 19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of ‘any 
alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more 
because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, 
committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States . . . .’”). 
75






 Id. at 361-62 (emphasis added). 
79




 Id. at 363. 
82
 Id. (citing 104 Stat. 5050). 
9
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discretionary power held by the Attorney General in 1996.
83
 The 
Attorney General had used that power to help over 10,000 noncitizens 
avoid deportation between 1991 and 1995.
84
 Since the 1996 law, 
deportation is virtually certain for noncitizens that commit deportable 
offenses.
85
 Because of this virtual certainty, and the “drastic measure” 
of deportation
86
, it is imperative that attorneys inform their noncitizen 
clients of the risks of pleading guilty to criminal offenses. 
First, this Comment will discuss the history of Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, specifically with regard to 
deportation. Next it will discuss the Seventh Circuit’s decision, 
Chavarria v. United States, which addresses misadvice and non-advice 
to noncitizens about deportation risks associated with plea bargains. 
Finally, this Comment will argue that the Seventh Circuit correctly 
decided Chavarria in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Padilla 
v. Kentcuky and Chaidez v. United States, though the outcome is 




This background section provides an overview of the cases 
leading up to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Chavarria v. United 
States. It begins with the Supreme Court case Padilla v. Kentucky, 
which established a distinct rule for Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases involving noncitizens. 
It then discusses the effect of Padilla and the resulting circuit split.
87
 
Finally, this section will discuss the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
                                                 
83
 Id. (citing 110 Stat. 3009-596). 
84
 Id. (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 
347 (2001)). 
85
 Id. at 363-364. 
86
 Id. at 360. 
87
 Callaghan, supra note 48 at 716 (noting “more than twenty-eight federal 
courts and sixteen state courts have reached opposing conclusions regarding whether 
Padilla is retroactively applicable”); see also id. at note 89 (listing district and state 
court cases which reached opposing results regarding Padilla’s retroactivity). 
10
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Chaidez v. United States and the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
affirmation. 
 
 A. Padilla v. Kentucky established that attorneys must inform their 
noncitizen clients about the risks of deportation associated with plea-
bargaining. 
 
In 2010, the Supreme Court greatly impacted immigration law 
with its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. The Petitioner, Jose Padilla, 
was born in Honduras, but had been living in the United States for 
over 40 years at the time of his arrest and even served as a soldier in 
the Vietnam War.
88
 He was arrested when he was found to be 
transporting marijuana in his tractor-trailer in Kentucky.
89
 Padilla pled 
guilty to the drug charges on his attorney’s advice.
90
 The charge he 
faced unambiguously provided,  
 
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted 
of a violation of (or a conspiracy to or attempt to violate) any 
law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign 
country relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a 
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 




His guilty plea to the drug charges meant that he would almost 
certainly face deportation, despite his attorney informing him that he 
“did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in 
the country so long.”
92
 Padilla alleged he would have proceeded to 
trial had he been advised of the consequences of his plea bargain.
93
 
Indeed, the Court noted that “[p]reserving the client’s right to remain 
                                                 
88






 Id. at 368 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(i)). 
92




Cronkite: Plead Guilty, You Could Face Deportation: Seventh Circuit Rules M
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
156 
in the United States may be more important to the client than any 
potential jail sentence.”
94
 The petitioner in Padilla claimed ineffective 
assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights 
because his attorney told him that pleading guilty to drug distribution 
charges would not affect his immigration status.
95
  The Supreme Court 
of Kentucky determined that Padilla was not entitled to post-
conviction relief because the Sixth Amendment does not protect 
criminal defendants from collateral consequences of convictions.
96
 
Since the Supreme Court of Kentucky deemed deportation a collateral 
consequence rather than a direct one, it found that the Sixth 
Amendment did not apply to Padilla’s claim.
97
 
The Supreme Court faced the issue of whether Jose Padilla’s 
attorney had the duty to inform him that guilty plea he was accepting 
for the drug charges would lead to his deportation. Unlike the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky, the Supreme Court found that deportation 
possesses a unique nature, which makes it incompatible with the 
collateral consequence doctrine.
98
 The Court therefore concluded that 
advice concerned with deportation falls under the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel under Strickland.
99
 
Therefore, the Court held that counsel must inform a client about the 




The Supreme Court began by analyzing Padilla’s claim using the 
Strickland two-part test. It found that “[t]he weight of prevailing 
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her 
                                                 
94
 Id. at 368 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
95
 Chaidez v. United States (“Chaidez I”), 655 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2011), 
aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 
96
 Id. at 359. 
97
 Id. at 365. 
98
 Id. at 366. 
99
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client regarding the risk of deportation.”
101
 Additionally, given the 
clarity of the statute that Padilla was charged under, it would have 
been simple for his attorney to conclude that pleading guilty would 
result in deportation.
102
 Padilla demonstrated that his attorney’s 
conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard
103
 and, 
therefore, satisfied the first prong of Strickland.
104
 The Court did not, 
however, determine if Padilla was entitled to relief under the new rule 
because they did not reach the second prong of Strickland.
105
 
The Supreme Court held that lawyers for noncitizens must inform 
their clients whether accepting a plea bargain risks deportation.
106
 
Ultimately, the Court declared that the noncitizen claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel under this new rule must show prejudice,
107
 such 
as a showing that he or she would not have pled guilty knowing the 







                                                 
101
 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367 (citing NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER 
ASSN., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 6.2 
(1995); G. HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 3.03, pp. 20-21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, 
supra, note 56, at 713-718; A CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 13:23 pp. 555, 560 
(3d ed. 2004); DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 2 COMPENDIUM OF 
STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY 
PERFORMANCE, pp. D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000) (providing survey of guidelines across 
multiple jurisdictions); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-5.1(a), p. 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(f), p. 116 (3d ed. 1999)). 
102
 Id. at 368-69. 
103
 Id. at 367 (“The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view 
that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”). 
104
 Id. at 369. 
105
 Id. at 360. 
106
 Id. at 374. 
107
 Id. at 360. 
108
 24-611 Moore’s Federal Practice – Criminal Procedure § 611.06, pg. 11. 
13
Cronkite: Plead Guilty, You Could Face Deportation: Seventh Circuit Rules M
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
158 
B. Chaidez I: The Seventh Circuit determined that the Padilla rule did 
not apply retroactively.  
 
After Padilla, the lower courts were split on whether Padilla’s 
rule would apply retroactively.
109
 In Chaidez v. United States, the 
petitioner moved to the United States from Mexico and became a 
lawful permanent resident in 1977.
110
 In 2003, Petitioner-Chaidez was 
indicted on three counts of mail fraud and pled guilty on the advice of 
counsel.
111
 Chaidez was sentenced to four years of probation in 2004, 
which she did not appeal.
112
 In 2009, the government began removal 
proceedings against Chaidez
113
 based on a federal law that allows for 




After deportation proceedings were initiated against her, Chaidez 
tried to overturn her conviction.
115
 In 2010, she filed a writ of coram 
nobis,
116
 in which she alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because 
                                                 
109
 See e.g., Chaidez v. United States (“Chaidez I”), 655 F.3d 684, 687 (7th 
Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 2011 WL 2557232, at *7 
(3d Cir. June 29, 2011) (“holding that [Padilla] simply applied the old [Strickland] 
rule, such that it is retroactively applicable on collateral review”); United States v. 
Diaz-Palmerin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37151 (N.D. Ill. April 5, 2011) (stating that 
Padilla did not apply a new rule); Martin v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
87706 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2010) (stating that Padilla did not apply a new rule); 
United States v. Chavarria, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38203, 2011 WL 1336565 (N.D. 
Ind. April 7, 2011) (stating that Padilla did not apply a new rule). But see United 
States v. Laguna, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38856, 2011 WL 1357538 (N.D. Ill. April 
11, 2011) (Padilla announced a new rule). 
110






 Id. (Chaidez’s mail fraud constituted an aggravated felony because it 
involved loss in excess of $10,000). 
114
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
115
 Chaidez I, 655 F.3d at 686. 
116
 Id. at 686-87 (“The writ of coram bonis, available under the All Writs Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides a method for collaterally attacking a criminal 
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her attorney did not warn her that she could be deported as a result of 
her guilty plea.
117
 The Supreme Court decided Padilla while Chaidez’s 
motion was pending. The district court determined that Padilla was 
not a new rule so it applied Padilla to Chaidez’s motion and vacated 
her conviction.
118
 The government appealed that decision and claimed 




The Seventh Circuit analyzed Chaidez I under Teague v. Lane, 
which determined whether constitutional rules of criminal procedure 
are retroactive.
120
 Under the Teague analysis, “a constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure applies to all cases on direct and collateral review 
if it is not a new rule, but rather an old rule applied to new facts,” 
whereas a new rule generally only applies to cases on direct review.
 121
 
A rule is new when it lacks precedential support at the time the 
defendant’s conviction is final.
122
 In sum, the Teague analysis looks 
(1) to when the defendant’s conviction became final; (2) to whether 
there was agreement among courts before the new rule was 
announced; and (3) if the rule is determined to be new, whether one of 
two exceptions to non-retroactivity apply.
123
 The first exception allows 
a new rule retroactive effect if “it addresses a substantive categorical 
guarantee accorded by the Constitution.”
124
 The second exception 




                                                                                                                   
conviction when a defendant is not in custody, and thus cannot proceed under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.”). 
117










 Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). 
123
 Callaghan, supra note 48, at 713. 
124
 Id. at 714-715. 
125
 Id. at 715. 
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To determine retroactivity, the court inquired if Padilla was 
subject to “debate among reasonable minds.”
126
 Reasonable debate 
may be indicated by lower courts being split on the issue or lack of 
unanimity on the Supreme Court in deciding the case.
127
 Based on this, 
the Seventh Circuit determined that the Padilla rule was a new rule.
128
 
It discussed the fact that the Padilla opinion had both a concurrence 
and dissent, in addition to the majority suggesting that the rule was not 
“dictated by precedent.”
129
 The court also noted that the definition of 
an old rule is defined narrowly, only including “those holdings so 
compelled by precedent that any contrary conclusion must be deemed 
unreasonable.”
130
 Further, it cites the handling of pre-Padilla Sixth 
Amendment cases, which only required attorneys to provide advice on 
direct consequences of guilty pleas.
131
 Since it determined Padilla did 
not announce a new rule under the Teague analysis, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision to vacate Chaidez’s 
conviction. 
 
C. Chaidez II: The Supreme Court affirms the Seventh Circuit holding 
that Padilla is not retroactive. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Seventh Circuit’s 
case, Chaidez I to resolve the circuit split regarding Padilla’s 
retroactivity. Many believed that the Supreme Court would find the 
Padilla rule to be retroactive, based on the language used in the 
Padilla decision.
132
 The Court acknowledged the government’s 
concern with keeping convictions from plea-bargaining final, but 
                                                 
126
 Chaidez I, 655 F.3d at 688. 
127






 Id. at 694. 
131
 Id. at 690. 
132
 See, e.g., Callaghan, supra note 48; N.Y. Times, Subject to Deportation, 
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 It stated that the rule would not “open the 
floodgates to challenges obtained through plea bargains.”
134
  
Contrary to that belief, the Supreme Court found that Padilla is a 
new rule, and thus not retroactive.
135
 The Court reasoned that while 
usually applications of Strickland to new facts did not create new 
rules, Padilla did something more than simply apply the Strickland 
test.
136
 Padilla first determined if Strickland even applied to 
deportation.
137
 Padilla rejected what lower courts seemed to agree on: 
that deportation is a collateral consequence and is thus out of reach of 
the Sixth Amendment.
138
 Given the decisions of the lower courts, and 
Padilla’s rejection of those decisions, the Supreme Court determined, 
using Teague, that the Padilla rule was indeed new as it was “not 
apparent to all reasonable jurists prior to our decision.”
139
 The Seventh 




CHAVARRIA V. UNITED STATES 
 
This section will discuss the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Chavarria v. United States when it determined whether there was a 
distinction between misadvice and nonadvice for purposes of the rule 






                                                 
133
 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 358 (2010).  
134
 Id. at 371. 
135






 Id. at 1111. 
139
 Id. (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 , 527-528 (1997) (internal 
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A. Factual History 
 
Julio Cesar Chavarria was born in Mexico, but became a resident 
of the United States in 1982.
141
 Chavarria was charged with four 
counts of distributing cocaine in 2009.
142
 He pled guilty to the 
charges.
143
 After Chavarria’s plea, the Supreme Court decided Padilla 
v. Kentucky.
144
 After Padilla was announced, Chavarria filed a pro se 
motion based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
145
  
Chavarria purported that when he inquired about deportation, his 
attorney responded that he did not need to worry about removal as the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement “said they were not 
interested in deporting him.”
146
 Chavarria also filed a Petition to Stay 





B. Procedural History 
 
The United States attempted to dismiss Chavarria’s § 2255 
motion, arguing that the Supreme Court’s Padilla decision created a 
new, proactive rule.
148
 The district court denied the United States’ 




                                                 
141






 Id.  
145
 Id. A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is a motion to vacate, set aside or 
correct a sentence. It is only available to those serving a federal sentence.  See the 
federal form Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence By a Person in 
Federal Custody, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/AO243.pdf). 
146






 Id. at 362. 
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Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
163 
Following the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit 
decided Chaidez I in 2011, holding that Padilla was a new rule and 
thus, not to be applied retroactively.
150
 Based on the Chaidez I ruling, 
the district court vacated its previous ruling and dismissed Chavarria’s 
§ 2255 motion.
151
 Chavarria then appealed the district court’s ruling, 
as well as the Seventh Circuit’s Chaidez decision.
152
 Unfortunately for 
Chavarria, in the meantime, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Chaidez I and affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the Padilla 
case issued a new rule, thereby barring retroactivity.
153
 
Since the Supreme Court’s affirmation of Chaidez I eliminated his 
retroactivity argument, Chavarria next argued that there is a distinction 
between non-advice and misadvice.
154
 Chavarria claimed that if an 
attorney does not provide any advice regarding deportation 
consequences, the new, proactive Padilla rule applies.
155
 However, if 
the attorney provides misadvice, or bad advice, “pre-Padilla law” 
applies.
156
 Essentially, Chavarria was claiming that Padilla does not 
apply to his case, therefore making it irrelevant that Padilla was found 
not to apply retroactively.
157
 Rather, he claimed his case, like all other 
affirmative misrepresentation claims, should have ben analyzed under 
Strickland.
158
 Chavarria based this argument on several other circuit 
court decisions, which held that “pre-Padilla, misstatements about 
deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim.”
159
 The 
court rejected this because those cases merely found that a lawyer 
                                                 
150
 Id. (See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1103 (2013)). 
151
















 Id. (stating “[t]rue enough, three federal circuits . . . held before Padilla that 
misstatements about deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim.”) 
(citing Chaidez v. United States (“Chaidez II”), 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2013). 
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C. Seventh Circuit’s Conclusion 
 
The Seventh Circuit was not persuaded by Chavarria’s distinction 
between misadvice and non-advice.
161
 First, it cites to Padilla, noting 
that the Supreme Court made no distinction between the two terms.
162
 
Since the Court did not distinguish misadvice from non-advice, that 
indicated to the Seventh Circuit that the rule applied to all forms of 
advice concerning deportation matters.
163
 
Next, it concluded that under Teague v. Lane, the precedent before 
Padilla “supporting the application of Strickland in this context” was 
insufficient.
164
 Under Teague v. Lane, for a rule to be applied 
retroactively, it must “be supported by ample existing precedent.”
165
 
As it mentioned in Chaidez I, lower courts consistently found 
deportation to be a collateral consequence in pre-Padilla days, 
therefore indicating lack of precedent.
166
 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit noted that the facts of Padilla v. 
Kentucky relating to the lawyer’s advice were essentially the same as 
the facts that Chavarria alleges.
167
 In other words, in both cases, the 
attorneys allegedly provided their immigrant clients with faulty advice 
concerning their removal risks. In Padilla, the attorney advised his 
noncitizen client that he would not be deported because he had been in 
the country for over 40 years.
168
 The Seventh Circuit stated, “. . . 
                                                 
160






 Id. at 362-63. 
164
 Id. at 362 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). 
165
 Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 301). 
166
 Chaidez v. United States (“Chaidez I”), 655 F.3d 684, 691-692 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
167
 Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 363. 
168
 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010). 
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Chavarria is essentially asking us to hold that Chaidez held that the 
Padilla rule is not retroactive except on Padilla’s own facts (which 
involved misadvice).”
169
 Consequently, it would not make sense to 








The Seventh Circuit correctly decided Chavarria v. United States 
because (1) the Supreme Court never made a distinction between 
misadvice and nonadvice; and (2) Chavarria’s argument fails on 
Padilla’s facts. However, although Chavarria was decided in 
accordance with precedent, the outcome of Chaidez has led to results 
that are contrary to Padilla’s true purpose. 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit correctly decided Chavarria v. United States 
based on the Chaidez v. United States precedent and the facts of 
Padilla. 
 
1. The Supreme Court never made a distinction between misadvice 
and non-advice. 
 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court never drew a line between 
misadvice and non-advice.
171
 The Seventh Circuit attributes this to the 
fact that prior to Padilla, non-citizens could not bring any Sixth 
Amendment claims with regard to deportation matters;
172
 that type of 
claim would fail Strickland’s first prong. Therefore, there was no need 
to distinguish between midadvice and non-advice because either way, 
there was no claim recognized under the Sixth Amendment analysis.
173
 
                                                 
169
 Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 363. 
170
 Id. at 363. 
171
 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356. 
172
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Not only that, but the Supreme Court affirmatively declined to limit 




Further, as the Seventh Circuit pointed out, the Court in Chaidez 
II referred to both affirmative misadvice and non-advice in its 
opinion.
175
 In Chaidez II, the Court, when discussing the distinction 
between collateral and direct consequences states, “it should not 
exempt from Sixth Amendment scrutiny a lawyer's advice (or non-
advice) about a plea's deportation risk.”
176
 Thus, the Supreme Court 
has twice failed to recognize the difference between misadvice and 
non-advice in regards to cases concerning deportation. This showed 
“the Padilla majority had no intent to exclude either affirmative 
misadvice or non-advice from the new rule it announced.”
177
 
Given that the defendant in Padilla was given incorrect advice 
regarding his removal by his attorney, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
Chavarria is correct. If the court decided the other way, lower courts 
would be forced to make an attenuated distinction between misadvice 
and nonadvice, which would be a very fine line in some 
circumstances. For example, if an attorney merely mentioned to his 
client that he or she would not be deported, that could arguably be 
construed as misadvice, or non-advice, if the client had no knowledge 
of the risk of deportation. If there was a distinction between the two, 
under Chavarria’s argument, a court would have to decide what type of 
advice the attorney gave which would then determine if that client 
could bring a Sixth Amendment claim. Courts should not be forced to 
make this distinction, and furthermore, Padilla does not require it. 
Even in cases like Chavarria where there is a clear-cut answer and the 
attorney’s advice falls squarely into either misadvice or non-advice, 
some noncitizens would be barred from bringing a Sixth Amendment 
                                                 
174
 Id. (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370-71). 
175
 Id. (citing Chaidez v. United States (“Chaidez II”), 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 
(2013)). 
176
 Chaidez II, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. 
177
 Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 363. 
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claim at all given that Strickland has never been applied to deportation 
matters. 
Additionally, if the Seventh Circuit had held the other way and 
determined that there is a distinction between misadvice and non-
advice for purposes of the Padilla rule, it would either give the rule a 
retroactive effect or impermissibly extend Strickland to deportation 
matters. This is because people who had been deported prior to 2010 
would be able to bring Padilla claims based on their lawyer’s 
misadvice. This would obviously contradict the explicit holding in the 
Chaidez decision, and could potentially result in the flood of litigation 




2. Chavarria’s argument that Padilla does not apply to his case fails on 
the facts of Padilla. 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s second reason for rejecting Chavarria’s 
claim was based on the facts of both Chavarria and Padilla. Chavarria 
argued that the Padilla rule did not apply to his case because he 
received affirmative misadvice whereas the Padilla rule applies only 
to non-advice.
179
 Recall that in both Padilla and Chavarria, the 
petitioners were both informed by their respective attorneys that the 
government was not interested in deporting them.
180
 Later, after 
pleading guilty, both defendants in each case were deported.
181
 
Therefore, the Padilla decision was based on Padilla’s attorney’s 
misadvice.
182
 It would be absurd for the Seventh Circuit to find that 
the Padilla rule does not apply to Padilla’s facts. 
 
 
                                                 
178
 But see Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371 (stating that Padilla will not have a 
significant effect on plea-bargains that have already been obtained). 
179
  Chavarria 739 F.3d at 362. 
180
 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 361. 
181
 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 361. 
182
 Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 363. 
23
Cronkite: Plead Guilty, You Could Face Deportation: Seventh Circuit Rules M
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
168 
3. The precedent set by Chaidez v. United States has led to unfair 
results that are contrary to the intent of Padilla. 
 
Although the Seventh Circuit basically had to decide Chavarria in 
the way that it did, the outcome still led to an absurd result. First, 
Chavarria’s result is odd when compared to Padilla itself. The 
Seventh Circuit noted the similarities in the facts between Chavarria 
and Padilla, which would lead one to assume that the cases would 
require the same result. However, Julio Cesar Chavarria was denied a 
claim under the Sixth Amendment, despite allowing Jose Padilla a 
claim (assuming he passed the second prong of Strickland). Although 
the Supreme Court did determine the Padilla rule to be a new rule and 
therefore not retroactive,
183
 it seems odd that it would intend for the 
opposite result in such a strikingly similar case. The outcome of 
Chavarria is directly contrary to that of Padilla. This discrepancy is 
especially strange in light of the purpose of the Padilla rule, which is 
to give non-citizens the constitutional protections of the Sixth 
Amendment because of the “harsh” nature of deportation.
184
 This 
interferes with the intent of Padilla. Given the extensive immigration 
background the Court gave, along with the recitation of immigration 
law norms, there can be no doubt the Court intended to give Sixth 
Amendment constitutional rights to immigrants. 
Further, the language of Padilla reads as if the Court intended for 
it to be retroactive.
185
 This is likely at least part of the cause of the 
circuit split regarding its retroactivity.
186
 One author even argues that 
the discussion concerning “floodgates” in Padilla would be irrelevant 
if the decision was meant to be prospective because it would not need 
                                                 
183
 See Chaidez v. United States (“Chaidez II”), 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 
184
 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
185
 See infra, BACKGROUND, section C. See also N.Y. Times, Subject to 




 See also Callaghan, supra note 48, at 703 (noting that of sixty-one courts, 
both state and federal level, to rule on the issue, thirty-eight determined that the 
Padilla rule was retroactive). 
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to address claims that would not exist under that interpretation.
187
 
While Padilla’s language may not mean much now because of the 
subsequent Chaidez decision, it does tend to show that the Court may 
have intended the rule to apply to a more people. At the very least, the 
Padilla decision shows that the Court intended the rule to help out 
non-citizens and immigrants who faced a particularly harsh penalty for 
what could be a relatively minor crime.
188
 
Additionally, in the Padilla case, there were concerns from the 
government that the ruling would result in a flood of litigation from 
previously deported non-citizens.
189
 This fear turned out to be 
unfounded, as there were relatively few cases brought in the interim 
between the Padilla and Chaidez decisions.
190
 Therefore, while the 
same fear of increased litigation is present in Chavarria, it would also 
likely be unfounded if the Seventh Circuit had ruled the opposite way. 
This does not mean that the Seventh Circuit ruled incorrectly, just that 
there likely would not be a flood of litigation from immigrants trying 




Because the facts of Padilla were analogous to the facts of 
Chavarria’s case, the Seventh Circuit had no choice but to rule the way 
it did. Holding that affirmative misadvice is analyzed strictly under 
Strictland, and not Padilla, would have been directly at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. However, the 
purpose of Padilla is frustrated by the subsequent case, Chaidez II. 
Similarly, Chavarria, while in accordance with precedent, impedes 
Padilla’s objective – giving noncitizens the constitutional protection of 
the Sixth Amendment when they are unaware and uninformed of the 
risks of pleading guilty to a wide range of criminal charges. 
 
                                                 
187
 Callaghan, supra note 48, at 730-31. 
188
 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
189
 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. 
190
 Callaghan, supra note 48 at 729-730. 
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